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How to Protect Future Generations’ Rights in European 
Governance
by Dr. Maja Göpel and Malte Arhelger
bstract: Given that future genera -
tions are right-bearing citizens of to-
morrow, legislative systems should
secure these rights through appropriate institu-
tions. In the case of the European Union, ref -
erence to intergenerational justice can be found
in various fundamental legal texts, but, para-
doxically, no institutions exist to defend it. The
structural short-termism inscribed into repre-
sentative democracies means that present inte-
r ests easily trump future concerns. We argue
that the best way to overcome this problem is a
system of temporal checks and balances. By
comparing a selection of existing instruments
with regards to their impact on the legislative
process, we propose the creation of a European
Guardian for Future Generations as the most
eﬀective measure to protect the rights of future
generations and provide an overview of recent
developments in this direction.1
The rights of future generations
In the philosophical debate, it is still unclear
how normative concepts like ‘obligations’,
‘rights’ or ‘harm’ may be interpreted, when
applied to the intergenerational context.
This is mostly due to the fact that future
people do not exist yet and that, conse-
quently, their number, identity and interests
remain unclear.2 At the same time, even in
the absence of a coherent ethical theory,
most people attribute moral importance to
the lives of future generations, and the dis-
course on the matter is typically a rights-
based one. If we declare universal human
rights for every individual, why should in-
dividuals born tomorrow not impose obli-
gations on present individuals? It therefore
seems appropriate to consider future people
as rights-bearers – even in the absence of a
clear definition of what this implies for pre-
sent people, practically and legally.3
This article will not be concerned with the
question of what exactly to transmit to fu-
ture generations, but focus on how to pro-
tect options and opportunities for similar
freedom of choice in the development of so-
cieties. We believe that the present genera-
tion is obliged to avoid and intervene with
trends that threaten these options and op-
portunities, such as biodiversity loss, climate
change, resource depletion, perpetuation
and aggravation of extreme poverty and in -
equity, to name a few. By means of regula-
tion, political institutions play an important
role in the execution of these responsibili-
ties. Given the increasing authoritative and
legislative power of the European Union,
this article explores how the European insti-
tutions may improve the protection of fu-
ture generations and concludes with the
recommendation of a new body with an ex-
plicit mandate for just that purpose.
Future generations in European 
legislation
To derive the institutional imperative for the
representation of future generations for
which we argue, we provide a brief historical
overview of the status of future generations
in European policies with reference to the
most significant developments in interna-
tional treaties and conventions.
Generally, it is important to distinguish bet-
ween explicit and implicit reference to  future
generations. Implicit formulations include
‘heritage’, implying that something is
handed on to posterity, and the principle of
‘sustainable development’, as it is defined by
the 1987 Brundtland Report: “development
that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future genera -
tions to meet their own needs.”4 Reference
to future generations in the European con-
text has gone from explicit and non-binding
to implicit and binding while taking an
 increasingly prominent place in European
legislation.
Future generations and European environ-
mental policy
In terms of oﬃcial recognition, the declara-
tions and recommendations of the United
Nations Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment in 1972 mark the be-
ginning of institutionalised environmental
politics. The wording of its final declaration5
influenced the first formulations of Euro-
pean environmental policies. In the Euro-
pean context, future generations are
mentioned for the first time in the 1973
Programme of Action of the European
Communities on the Environment. When
explaining the need for awareness of envi-
ronmental problems, the document states
that “educational activity should take place
in order that the entire Community may be-
come aware of the problem and assume its
responsibilities in full towards the genera -
tions to come.”6 The Commission’s 1974
Recommendation concerning the protection
of birds and their habitat also contains an
indirect reference to future generations,
when it notes that “[p]ublic opinion is com -
ing to consider migratory birds more and
more as a common heritage.”7 However,
these formulations were hardly of binding
character and appear rather randomly.
Meanwhile, with the adoption of the first
pieces of binding European environmental
legislation, normative reference to future ge-
nerations disappears almost completely. This
is also certainly due to the much narrower-
legislative mandate of the European Com-
munities at that time. The objectives then
were the creation of a common market and
included neither reference to future genera-
tions nor to the environment. Accordingly,
the 1975 Waste Framework Directive,
among the first legally binding texts in the
environmental field, while calling for the
“recovery of waste (...) to conserve natural
resources,”8 referred to the functioning of
the common market and to Article 235 of
the Treaty of Rome, regulating Community
action in the case of absence of any further
legal basis. 
The 1976 Bathing Water Directive pres -
ented a similar situation. While arguing that
the surveillance of bathing water is necessary
in order to attain the objectives of the com-
mon market, it applies a relatively large de-
finition of ‘bathing water’.9 Similarly, the
1979 Bird Directive describes the protection
of wild bird species in the EU as a means to
fulfil the objectives of the common market –
A
It was never the people who complained
of the universality of human rights, nor
did the people consider human rights as
a Western or Northern imposition. It
was often their leaders who did so. 
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tainable development gains further momen-
tum after the 1992 United Nations Confe-
rence on Environment and Development in
Rio de Janeiro, in the form of the Fifth En-
vironmental Action Programme: Towards
Sustainability.21
Sustainable development: future generations in
the treaties
Future generations make their first implicit
appearance in the European treaties through
a principle of sustainable development in the
1997 Amsterdam Treaty.22The 2000 Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union is the first fundamental legal text
mentioning future generations explicitly. Its
preamble states that the rights ensured by
the Charter entail duties with regards to fu-
ture generations.23 The document becomes
legally binding with the adoption of the
2008 Lisbon Treaty. Several articles of the
Treaty contain references to future genera -
tions in the form of the principle of sustain -
able development, namely in Articles 3 and
21, and Article 37, which states that “[a]
high level of environmental protection and
the improvement of the quality of the envi-
ronment must be integrated into politics of
the Union and ensured in accordance with
the principle of sustainable development.”24
Ever since the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the
principle of sustainable development has be-
come the predominant wording to frame en-
vironmental policies in European discourse.
This is true not only of the Council declara-
tions urging the implementation of the prin-
ciple (namely Luxemburg 1997, Cardiﬀ
1998, Vienna 1998, Cologne 1999 and Hel-
sinki 1999), but also for various policy pro-
grammes of the European Commission.
These include, most prominently, the 2001
European Sustainable Development Strategy
A Sustainable Europe for a Better World25 and
its 200526 and 200927 revisions, and also the
2004 Action Plan on Environmental Tech-
nologies.28 It may also be worth noting that
references to intergenerational justice can be
found in various member-state constitu -
tions. Eight constitutions contain explicit re-
ferences to future generations (Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany,
Luxemburg, Poland, and Sweden), and five
constitutions make indirect reference to fu-
ture generations via the concept of heritage
(Finland, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia).
Almost all texts contain references to the role
of the state concerning the protection of the
environment.29
Despite ample references to intergenera -
Articles defining issues regarded as relevant
to protect for future generations, including
non-environmental ones like education,
peace, common heritage and cultural diver-
sity.15The declaration is however not legally
binding.
Fourth, and from a legal perspective most
notably, the 1998 Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in
 Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, a regional UN con-
vention, contains a concrete description of
how rights of future generations transform
into present duties. Also known as the Aar-
hus Convention, it states that “every person
has the right to live in an environment
 adequate to her or his health and well-being,
and the duty, both individually and in asso-
ciation with others, to protect and improve
the environment for the benefit of present
and future generations.”16 Especially when
 arguing for an institution protecting future
generations, it should be noted, the pream-
ble obliges the State to support citizens in
exercising their rights and duties. It states
that “to be able to assert this right and ob-
serve this duty, citizens must have access to
information, be entitled to participate in de-
cision-making and have access to justice in
environmental matters”, and that “citizens
may need assistance in order to exercise their
rights.”17 But it was not until 2006 that this
path-breaking Convention became Euro-
pean law.18
From Rio to Brussels
Since the publication of the 1987 Brundt-
land Report, future generations have receiv -
ed attention in the European Council,
implicitly and explicitly, albeit only in non-
binding declarations. Nevertheless, this fact
indicates how intergenerational justice has
become a growing concern for European
 policy makers. The first declaration taking
up the prominent implicit formula of sus -
tainable development is the 1988 Rhodes
Summit Declaration on the Environment,
which states that “sustainable development
must be one of the overriding objectives of
all Community policies.”19 Another notably
explicit example is the 1990 Dublin Sum-
mit Declaration on the Environmental Im-
perative, which states that “[m]ankind is the
trustee of the natural environment and has
the duty to ensure its enlightened steward-
ship for the benefit of this and future genera -
tions.”20 But it is equally notable that, given
its boldness, this declaration remains with
only few consequences. The principle of  sus -
although, exceptionally, it also states that
“species of wild birds naturally occurring in
the European territory of the Member States
(...) constitute a common heritage” and
views “the long-term protection and ma-
nagement of natural resources as an integral
part of the heritage of the peoples of
Europe.”10 Additionally, the preamble of the
1985 Environmental Impact Assessment Di-
rective states that the eﬀects of human in-
tervention on nature must be observed “to
ensure maintenance of the diversity of
 species and to maintain the reproductive ca-
pacity of the ecosystem as a basic resource
for life”. It also states that cultural heritage
shall be taken into account in this assess-
ment.11 Overall, however, European envi-
ronmental legislation has only referred to
future generations randomly and implicitly.
International treaties: future generations
through the backdoor
It is mainly through conventions of the
 Unit ed Nations (UN) that reference to fu-
ture generations finds its way back into Eu-
ropean legislation, primarily via preambles.
This is the case, first, for the 1982 Conven-
tion on the conservation of migratory spe-
cies of wild animals, according to the
preamble of which “each generation of man
holds the resources of the earth for future ge-
nerations and has an obligation to ensure
that this legacy is conserved and, where
 utilized, is used wisely.”12 Second, in the
1993 European Council decision on the
1992 Convention on Biodiversity, which
 refers to future generations in its preamble,13
the European environmental policy agenda
adapts again to that of the UN. The Euro-
pean Council decision states that the reason
for the EU to adhere to the convention is
the fact that “conservation of biological
 diversity is a global concern and it is there-
fore appropriate for the Community and its
Member States to participate in internatio-
nal eﬀorts.” The preamble continues that the
“conservation and sustainable use of biolo-
gical diversity” are appropriate means to
 attain this goal.14Third, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nisation’s Declaration on the Responsibili-
ties of the Present Generations Towards
Future Generations in 1997 contains twelve
5
For a successful technology, 
reality must take precedence over
public relations, for nature cannot
be fooled.
/ Richard P. Feynman /
Existing intergenerational checks and
balances
Unlike present people, future people cannot
themselves protest against present political
decisions or argue how these will inflict
upon their lives and wellbeing. Several coun-
tries around the world have acknowledged
this representational omission and estab -
lished institutions to protect the interests of
future people. In this paper we only discuss
institutions that can engage in the legislative
process.31 Our primary purpose is to
 evaluate how such institutions could be
 important governance innovations in repre-
sentative democracies, so that core mandates
and functions can be defined for the Euro-
pean governance level.
It is necessary to clarify the terminology used
to distinguish the various sorts of temporal
checks and balances existing in national po-
litical systems. We will distinguish instituti-
ons according to the way their holders are
appointed and the status of their legal basis.
Intergenerational Justice Review
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We will call Parliamentary Committee an in-
stitution consisting of directly elected
 parliamentarians, operating on the basis of
parliamentary rules of procedure, Parlia-
mentary Commissioner an institution held by
an appointed or indirectly elected non-par-
liamentarian, operating on the basis of
 parliamentary rules of procedure and Com-
missioner an institution consisting of an
 appointed or indirectly elected non-parlia-
mentarian, operating on the basis of an in-
dependent legislation. Several other possible
mechanisms of temporal checks and balan-
ces are discussed in the academic literature,
including reserved seats in parliament,32
 deliberative control mechanisms33 and spe-
cialized second chambers.34 We will limit
our discussion to existing cases. 
A few remarks on methodology
We will attempt to determine which model
best suits our goal to identify a strong me-
chanism of temporal checks and balances.
6
tional justice in constitutive legal frame-
works at the European and national levels,
and notwithstanding the fact that since the
1998 Cardiﬀ summit, attempts have been
made to  institutionalise European sustaina-
ble development policies – and three more
summits were dedicated to the issue (Hel-
sinki 1998, Gothenburg 2001 and Barcelona
2002) – there is neither an institutional me-
chanism to ensure that self-imposed obliga-
tions in sustainable-development issues are
in fact respected, nor a clear reference to esta-
blish such a mechanism. The respective le-
gislation would have to rely on Article 352
of the Lisbon Treaty; the Council may adopt
appropriate measures to attain objectives set
out in the treaties, which cannot be attained
with the powers provided by the treaties.30
The credit crunch is about borrowing
from our children; the climate
crunch is about stealing from them.
/ David Pencheon /
Institution Country 1) independent 2) proficient 3) transparent 4) legitimate 5) having access 6) being 
accessible
Parliamentary 
Committee
Table 1. Examples of institutional mechanisms of temporary checks and balances in comparison.
Finland (Tulevai-
suusvaliokunta,
1999), Germany
(Parlamentari-
scher Beirat für
Nachhaltige Ent-
wicklung 2006)
Separate body 
inside the legisla-
tive, consisting of
elected parliamen-
tarians. Flowing
from parliamen-
tary rules of pro-
cedure. Separate
budget (Finland).35
Body publishes 
reports and advi-
ses other standing
committees.36
Members have
 voting rights in
plenary.
Bound by manda-
tes to follow-up
on governmental
long-term strate-
gies. Body pub -
lishes general re-
ports on regular
basis and specific
 reports and state-
ments on topical
issues.
Body established
by government
(Germany) or
emerged in parlia-
mentary debate
(Finland). Mem-
bers elected in
 direct elections.
Members may ob-
tain governmental
information by
the procedure of
written or oral
questions. Mem-
bers can initiate
research on future
scenarios in va-
rious policy fields
(Finland).
Body shall im-
prove communi-
cation among
relevant political
actors and include
general public in
the debate on
 sustainable deve-
lopment.37
Parliamentary
Commissioner
Israel (Israeli
Commission for
Future Generati-
ons, 2001-2006)
Flowing from par-
liamentary rules 
of procedure. 
Separate budget,
which is part of
the Parliament’s
budget.38
Body publishes
statements. May
ask for delaying
legislative decisi-
ons to present
statements.39
Bound by man-
date to report on
bills with “signifi-
cant consequences
for future genera-
tions.”40 Body 
publishes general
report on regular
basis.
Body conceived
by parliamentary
vote on parlia-
mentary rules of
procedure. Holder
appointed on
merit-base.41
Body has access to
state institutions
defined under the
State Comptroller
Act.42 Body may
express opinions
on laws and advise
parliamentarians.
It may appear in
parliamentary
committees.
Body receives all
bills and second -
ary legislation
treated in Parlia-
ment. De facto, it
also became a
gateway for eco-
nomic and civil-
society actors.43
Commissioner Canada (Com-
missioner for
 Environment and
Sustainable Deve-
lopment, 1995),
Hungary (Parlia-
mentary Com-
missioner for
Future Generati-
ons, 2006), New
Zealand (Parlia-
mentary Com-
missioner for the
Environment,
1986)
Flowing from se-
parate legislation.
Separate budget
determined in the
State budget,
which is passed by
the Parliament.
Body may initiate
suspension of
 administrative or
other acts poten t i-
ally causing
 irreversible
 environmental
 damage. It may
therefore appear
in court. It may
initiate judicial
 reviews, when im-
proprieties occur,
i.e. when laws vio-
late fundamental
rights.44
Bound by man-
date to “ensure the
protection of the
fundamental right
to a healthy envi-
ronment”,45 which
is a fundamental
right. Body regu-
larly publishes
 general report.
Body conceived
by parliamentary
vote on respective
legislation. Holder
selected on merit-
base, confirmed
by parliamentary
majority
 (Hungary).46
Body may investi-
gate any activity,
limited only by
state secrecy, not
by business secrecy.
It may urge the
Parliament to dis-
cuss grave impro-
prieties. It may
appear in Parlia-
ment.47
Anybody has the
right to petition.
Body may also
 investigate on its
own initiative.
sioner was established after a grassroots in-
itiative by the Civil Society Organisation Vé-
degylet (Protect the Future).50 The
Parliamentary Committees, on the other
hand, have most impact on political actors.51
If a body is supposed to have 5) the neces-
sary  access to compile information, it needs
 extensive authority to request the informa-
tion. The mandate of the Hungarian Com-
missioner is most generous, in this sense.
Finally, if a body is supposed to be 6) acces-
sible, it should allow for institutionalised
and inclusive input. Again, given that the
Hungarian Commissioner may be petition -
ed like an ombudsman, its mandate seems
the most developed in comparison.
Second, we need to be clear about the heu-
ristic value of this comparison: while there
is some evidence that the model of the Hun-
garian Parliamentary Commissioner can be
eﬀective in protecting future generations
from present abuse of power, this article does
not suggest that the Hungarian model is a
blueprint to be transposed to the European
level. Rather, it suggests that if our objective
is to establish an eﬀective mechanism of
temporal checks and balances at the Euro-
pean level, the Hungarian case can serve as
the most notable precedent. Yet, its mandate
is limited to the protection of the environ-
ment, while the Israeli Commissioner over-
saw twelve policy areas, therefore being
closer to a holistic protection of living con-
ditions for future generations, similar to the
UNESCO Declaration cited above.
Since the fundamental rights adopted with
the Lisbon Treaty do not include the right to
a healthy environment anyway, the mandate
for a European body could be to build on the
aim of the European Union as  defined in Ar-
ticle 3 of the Treaty: “to promote peace, its
values and the well-being of its peoples.”52
The objectives listed in  Article 3 to reach this
aim range across many issue areas from eco-
nomics to security and culture and could
provide the lens to decide which policy deci-
sions need to be scrutinized regarding their
impact on future peoples’ wellbeing. Such a
mandate would directly support the com-
mitments made on sustain able development,
as it would improve coherence and eﬃcacy
of European policies drafted in single-issue
departments and would provide the principle
of intergenerational solidarity with teeth. In
addition, it would be helpful to avoid the
term ‘Commissioner’ in order to avoid con-
fusion with  existing European commissio-
ners. A ‘European Guardian for Future
Generations’ could be a solution.
Intergenerational Justice Review
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filling any one of the six criteria can function
to some extent as a mechanism of temporal
checks and balances. But the more an insti-
tution fulfils several criteria, the better it
seems equipped for this task. With these re-
marks in mind we may begin our compara-
tive assessment (See Table 1).
Indicative conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from this
comparison? First, we may consider how exi-
sting bodies rank in relation to the  defined
criteria. If a body functioning as a mecha-
nism of temporal checks and balances is sup-
posed to be 1) independent, according to
the logic of the division of powers, then a
post in this body should not be held by the
same person holding a post in another
branch of political power. Ideally, this body
shall also rest on an independent legal basis,
in order to increase the independence of the
respective body. The Hungarian Commis-
sioner enjoys most independence, even
though its budget depends on the decision
of the Országgyűlés (Hungarian Parlia-
ment). If a body is supposed to be 2) profi-
cient, then it should have legally binding
competences. The Hungarian Commissio-
ner is the only body with legally binding
tools. It may be added that the Israeli Com-
mission enjoyed a de facto veto power: it
could use the right to deliver statements in a
tactical way, so that decisions could be post-
poned and eventually dropped, when the
parliamentary schedule allowed no delays.48
But this power is risky to use, since it is
 likely to destroy the trust-based cooperation
between deputies and the Parliamentary
Commission. If a body is supposed to be 3)
transparent, it needs a clear and direct man-
date and should report regularly about its re-
sults. While all examined bodies provide
regular reports, the Hungarian Commissio-
ner has the most direct mandate for action.
The influence of the other bodies’ mandates
depends on the activity of third, either
 executive or legislative, bodies. If a body is
supposed to be 4) legitimate, it should enjoy
large public support or even have emerged
as a response to citizen action. While the
 Israeli Commission was established top-
down, the results of its work were commu-
nicated widely through good relationships
with the media.49 The Hungarian Commis-
The ideal institution should respond to two
sorts of requirements. Firstly, it should ad-
dress the requirements of the separation of
powers. This means it should be indepen-
dent and its function should be to increase
political eﬃciency by reducing the abuse of
political power. The abuse of political power
can impose political and economic costs for
present and future generations. Costs to the
present generation include the costs caused
by friction in the political process, for
 example legitimacy gaps through lack of
consultation, or short-term delivery gaps
through tactical procrastination of agree-
ment. Costs to future people include the
costs of, for example, climate change,  bio -
diversity loss, or other risky technology choi-
ces, in particular if they are not addressed at
an early stage because of short-term interest
dominance. Secondly, the institution should
be capable of integrating the high level of
uncertainty related to long-term develop-
ments and accommodate the possibility of
technological and social innovations in its
considerations.
Based on this reasoning, we can define six
criteria for comparative analysis. For the in-
stitution to be able to limit the abuse of
power of present institutions, it has to be 1)
independent and 2) proficient. For the in-
stitution to increase the eﬃciency of policy
making, it needs to be 3) transparent and 4)
legitimate by democratic standards. While
the interests of present and future genera -
tions may be opposed in particular issues,
the institution as such should be democrati-
cally legitimate so that its existence derives
from the general importance people attri-
bute to future generations. Analogously, a
complainant may be opposed to a legal de-
cision contrary to her or his interest but still
attribute legitimacy to judicative institutions
with the mandate to protect the general in-
terest. To enable the institution to cope with
uncertainty, it should 5) have access to all
the relevant information and 6) be widely
accessible to expert assessments and citizens’
concerns so that well-informed and broad
argumentation becomes possible. In prac-
tice, activities falling under 6) may be iden-
tical with activities falling under 3).
However, transparency is an output-related
quality, accessibility is clearly input-related.
The more the institution is accessible, the
sooner it may adapt to change and the lower
the risk its focus remains systemically limi-
ted to particular issues.
How shall these criteria be treated when
comparing institutions? Any institution ful-
7
Maturity is the capacity to endure
uncertainty. 
/ John Huston Finley /
Initiatives for a European representation
of future generations
This final section will discuss past initiatives
for establishing an institutional representa-
tion of future generations and indicate some
strategies for further action. During the past
decade, all of these initiatives originated
from civil society.53
The most important initiative was once
again organised by Védegylet. When the law
establishing the Hungarian Commissioner
for Future Generations was adopted in Hun-
gary in 2006, Védegylet decided to move
onto the European level.54The activists  gain -
ed support from the conservative Member
of the European Parliament (MEP) Kinga
Gál, who gathered three other MEPs behind
the initiative. In June 2008 the group orga-
nised a public event at the European Parlia-
ment, and in September it started to collect
signatures for the Written Declaration on
the need to establish a Representation for
Future Generations in the European Union.
The text demanded that the Commission
and the Council should investigate three
possibilities to protect the rights of future
generations. Firstly, protection of future ge-
nerations might become part of the respon-
s ibilities of the existing European
Ombudsman. Secondly, questions of inter-
generational justice could be integrated into
the portfolio of a European Commissioner.
Thirdly, the European Fundamental Rights
Agency might be charged with the enforce-
ment of future generations’ rights.55 How -
ever, without civil society support in Brussels
and at the end of the legislative period, the
necessary number of signatures for adoption
of the declaration was not achieved. 
Yet, the new legislative period provides a
new opportunity to reinvigorate the initia-
tive for future generations’ rights and this
 article sought to investigate characteristics
that would promise the highest eﬀectiveness.
The options proposed in the 2008 Declara-
tion of MEPs may seem to be politically
 easier and economically cheaper solutions,
but only a Guardian with the explicit man-
date to defend the rights of future genera -
8
tions will operate without the conflict of
short- versus long-term interests within it. It
would provide a solid mechanism of tempo-
ral checks and balances in decisions on in-
frastructure, energy, ecosystem protection,
production technologies and materials, con-
flict resolution strategies and investment
priorities that will significantly impact the
quality of life in the century to come. 
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Crimes against Future Generations: Implementing 
Intergenerational Justice through International Criminal Law
by Sébastien Jodoin
ntergenerational justice not only requi-
res the adoption of best practices and
 policies, but also the prevention and re-
pression of deleterious and morally blame-
worthy human behaviour which has severe
impacts on the long-term health, safety and
means of survival of groups of individuals.
While many international crimes have indi-
rect consequences on the well-being of present
and future generations, it cannot be said that
existing international criminal law is currently
well-placed to directly and clearly protect in-
tergenerational rights. As such, the develop-
ment of a new type of international crime,
crimes against future generations, may be a
promising avenue for implementing intergene-
rational justice. Such a crime would penalise
acts or conduct that amount to serious violati-
ons of existing international law regarding eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights or the
environment.1
Introduction
Intergenerational justice remains a largely
abstract concept in international policy – it
is not recognised in any binding instrument
of international law. Although the notions
of the rights or interests of future genera -
tions are referenced in a few non-binding in-
ternational instruments, the legal means for
directly enforcing or protecting these rights
are non-existent. Given that international
law tends to develop in an incremental and
I
